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Abstract
In this paper, we look back at the XIX century France to shed light on effect of
competition in the stock exchange industry. During the XIX century the Paris financial
centre plays a central role in the French financial markets. Nevertheless, six organized
regional exchanges do exist along all the second half of the century. A recent literature
started to study the complex functioning of the Paris financial centre as well as the
interaction between its two components, the official Paris Bourse and its OTC rival, the
Coulisse. Nevertheless, a very small literature is devoted to the regional French exchanges.
By studying the interactions between Paris and Lyon, we find that, after the 1881-
1882 boom and burst, the Lyon Stock Exchange has to struggle for surviving facing fierce
competition from the Paris Bourse and main national banks particularly after the 1898
reorganisation of the Paris financial centre, while the strong activity of Coulisse before the
1895 gold mines crash had a positive effect on the Lyon one. After the 1898 reorganisation,
the Lyon Stock Exchange survived thanks to a new listing policy favourable to SMEs and
the development of second-tier market for both these unofficially traded SMEs and unlisted
risky (mainly foreign) stocks. On the other side, the progressive homogenisation of the
official market imposed by regulators to enhance their control over the French securities
market acted as force driving trading to Paris: only the facilities the Lyon Exchange gave
to the main banks of the financial centre maintained some activity.
Keywords: Lyon Stock Exchange, Paris Stock Exchange, Coulisse, competition, exchanges.
JEL classifications: N23, N93.
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1 Introduction
The European Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), which came into force
in November 2007 and currently under review, made competition among trading platforms
the principle governing the European stock exchange industry and achieved the creation of
a “market for markets” in Europe1. This process started with the measures undertaken to
foster integration among national financial systems. These measures lowered the barriers to
competition among trading platforms in Europe.
Four years after the MiFID implementation, a simple observation of the European finan-
cial market shows that competition led to the fragmentation of European trading. The fast
entry of many new players has reshaped the organisation of the industry. This has raised
concerns about the oversight of the market: national watchdogs have underscored the issues
they face in monitoring the market because of its high level of fragmentation. On the other
hand, the new competitive framework pushed the incumbent stock exchanges to mergers and
acquisitions as strategic move to defend their market shares, while some signs of a challengers’
consolidation process appears: recently, the platform BATS has bought its competitor Chi-
X. The mergers and acquisitions raised concerns from the European competition authorities
because of the dominant position merged players could reach, as it has been the case for the
merger between NYSE-Euronext and Deutsche Bo¨rse. Nevertheless, the European Commis-
sion does not oppose to the merger between NYSE-Euronext and ICE.
At the same time, competition focused the attention of trading venues on both the most
liquid stocks and bigger (often high frequency) investors. According to many market par-
ticipants and regulators, competition among stock exchanges harmed the financial markets’
contribution to small and medium businesses (SMEs). SMEs play a crucial role in the Euro-
pean economies. The new European regulatory banking and insurance framework (Basel III;
Solvency II) will likely reduce the funding SMEs get from financial intermediaries while fi-
nancial turmoil already hit SMEs’ financing. This is why private and public bodies across
Europe are putting in place actions and policies to develop the support financial markets can
give to SME’s developments. Recently, the British Business Secretary, Vince Cable, proposed
to re-open some regional stock exchanges to make it easier for firms to attract investment. In
France, a new“Exchange for the Business (Bourse de l’Entreprise)” is to be created in Paris to
list and trade the stocks of SMEs, while the Lyon financial center is planning the re-opening
of a local exchange.
1We are grateful for helpful suggestions from participants at the LARHRA Seminar in Lyon, the “Doc-
torissimes” Conference in Paris, the Fifth European Stock Market History Conference in Antwerp, the VIII
European Historical Economics Society Summer School in Madrid, the 16th Summer School in History of Eco-
nomic Thought, Economic Philosophy and History of Economics in Ankara, the Second Conference on “Links
between Finance and Industry” in Lyon, the Frontier Research in Economic and Social History Meeting in
Florence. We have received valuable comments from Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur, Kim Oosterlinck, Andre´ Straus
and Euge`ne White. We remain solely responsible for the errors and interpretations.
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According to standard models, competition among trading platforms would lead to the
emergence of a single market due to externalities of liquidity and the reduction in information
asymmetries resulting from the consolidation of the price discovery process. Therefore, con-
solidation would be the natural and desirable output of competition. More recent literature
in market microstructure show that well differentiated exchanges can co-exist if investors’ and
issuers’ preferences are heterogeneous. The exchanges’ various settings would match the pref-
erences of all the potential participants and bring them into the markets. Nevertheless, the
actual output of the competition among stock exchanges and its welfare implications are still
an open empirical question. Does competition lead naturally to a single market? Is the “one-
fits-all”model is desirable? Is there still scope for peripheral (national or local) exchanges? If
yes, why? What are the relationships between core and peripheral venues? Does an increase
in the central venue leads increases in the peripheral one? Is the opposite true? What are
the implications of the stock exchanges’ competitive framework for SMEs?
In this paper, we look back at the XIX century France to shed light on these questions.
During the XIX century the Paris financial centre plays a central role in the French financial
markets. Nevertheless, six organized regional exchanges do exist along all the second half of
the century2. A recent literature started to study the complex functioning of the Paris finan-
cial centre as well as the interaction between its two components, the official Paris Bourse and
its OTC rival, the Coulisse. Nevertheless, a very small literature is devoted to the regional
French exchanges (see Riva (2012) for a review).
We find that, after the 1881-1882 boom and burst, the Lyon Stock Exchange has to strug-
gle for surviving facing fierce competition from the Paris Bourse and main national banks
particularly after the 1898 reorganisation of the Paris financial centre, while the strong activ-
ity of Coulisse before the 1895 gold mines crash had a positive effect on the Lyon one. After
the 1898 reorganisation, the Lyon Stock Exchange survived thanks to a new listing policy
favourable to SMEs and the development of second-tier market for both these unofficially
traded SMEs and unlisted risky (mainly foreign) stocks. On the other side, the progressive
homogenisation of the official market imposed by regulators to enhance their control over the
French securities market acted as force driving trading to Paris: only the facilities the Lyon
Exchange gave to the main banks of the financial centre maintained some activity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the section 2, we discuss the theoretical
argument about the competition among stock exchanges. In the section 3, we show how the
Lyon Stock Exchange comes into the boom and burst of 1881-1882. Section 4 describes the
hard recovery of the 1880s, while section 5 shows how the Lyon Stock Exchange survives
during the Belle E´poque. Section 6 concludes.
2Lyon (founded in 1845), Bordeaux (1846), Marseille (1847), Toulouse (1852), Lille (1861) and Nantes
(1868). An organized market was set up in 1881 in Nice and closed in 1887.
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2 What does theory say about competition among exchanges?
The outcome of competition among exchanges can lead to two different equilibria: a sin-
gle market or a set of differentiated exchanges. On the one hand, agglomerating forces like
economies of scale and externalities work for the concentration of both investors and issuers
in a single exchange; on the other hand competition among exchanges could act as “a deglom-
erative force” (Gehrig 1998), in presence of heterogeneous investors, barriers to information
flows or even just complex information. If there is a consensus in the literature on the fact
that the co-existence of similar exchanges in an informationally integrated space is a waste
of resources, there are arguments to support the view that different exchanges could offer
trading and listing venues for investors and issuers otherwise left out of the market because
a single exchange would not satisfy their preferences.
Standard theory suggests that the outcome of competition among exchanges is the emer-
gence of a unique exchange. On the one hand, positive network externalities – mainly liquidity
– leads to concentration (Di Noia 2001, Glosten 1994, Pagano 1989). On the other, a single
exchange maximizes economies of scale and scope (Gehrig 1998, Pirrong 1999, Stigler 1964),
and allows fixed costs to be amortized on more transactions, leading to lower transactions
costs. Concentration leads to higher liquidity, more efficient prices, less information asym-
metries and more incentives for firms to list their shares, broadening the scope for portfolio
diversification (Ramos & von Thadden 2008). These increasing returns suggest that a single
exchange is the natural and optimal outcome of competition (Arthur 1989, Demsetz 1968,
Di Noia 2001, Economides 1993, Glosten 1994, Hagel & Armstrong 1997, Pagano 1989, 1993,
Stigler 1961, Telser 1981). From this point of view, competition would lead to homogenisa-
tion of stock exchanges’ models. Exchanges would adopt the winning first-mover organisation
lowering transaction costs. Nonetheless, at the equilibrium, only the exchange performing
better the adopted organisation would survive, absorbing the activity of the others.
Nevertheless, a single exchange faces some dilemma difficult to cut given the joint endo-
geneity of the market microstructure components. The literature has emphasized that it is
impossible to design a market satisfying the heterogeneous preferences of market participants
who are sensible to different dimensions of market efficiency like liquidity, transparency, imme-
diacy and security (Schwartz 1995). A major trade-off is between liquidity and transparency.
Standard microstructure models (see Madhavan (2000), Biais et al. (2005) for reviews) intro-
duce at least two types of investors: big informed traders such as financial institutions and
small, uninformed traders like private investors. High levels of ex ante and ex post market
transparency discourage informed traders by making their information available to all mar-
ket participants. On the other hand, if the single exchange opts for opacity, it discourages
uninformed traders from entering the market3. This could lead to the emergence of separate
3The rationale is that in a transparent market small investors could easily check if they obtain a fair price.
The operational force behind this rationale is that the disclosure of trading information to a large set of market
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markets for the two groups if informed traders are not willing to sacrifice part of their profits
in order to attract the uninformed ones on a transparent market as the bonding hypothesis
predicts (Coffee Jr 2002): according to this view, the informed traders are ready to trade into
a transparent market because they need the liquidity of uninformed traders.
This issue is strongly related to the choice of the trading system: if traders realize a con-
stant flow of operations using the services of market makers, the prices remain essentially
private and the market quite opaque (at least before computers); on the other hand, if an
auction market is adopted, all participants bringing the sell or buy orders to a single con-
frontation or fixing, a more representative price is obtained and the price discovery process is
very transparent (so the preference of Walras for this organization). The choice of a continu-
ous auction with starting fixing for specific (derivatives) operations could reduce the execution
risk, almost non-existent in a dealer market, and enhance immediacy. As a consequence, the
issues above are related to the informational value of market prices and then to informational
efficiency of the market (Pagano & Ro¨ell 1996).
These choices are linked to the membership regime of the exchanges. All the organised ex-
changes set membership criteria according to the other microstructure options. Loose criteria
imply a high number of market participants; high criteria lead to a small, if not fixed, number.
At least before computers, a high number of participants cannot run a transparent market
as well as a small (fixed) number does. Another important issue is investors’ protection: if
the stock exchange’s access is very open, it is difficult to create common guarantee above
the (relatively small) guarantee of each operator4. A central counterparty would be attrac-
tive to risk-averse investors but would likely create moral-hazard problems among brokers if
they are not sufficiently controlled, something in contradiction with free entry and unlimited
risk-taking. It is even more difficult in a loose-membership-criteria market to put in place
operational structures reducing transaction costs, such as effective and rapid settlement and
delivery procedures that require constant credit flows and then mutual guarantee and confi-
dence among participants.
Finally, these choices are also related to the type of securities listed. Firstly, an opaque
exchange attracting informed investors could provide high liquidity for large issues of quasi-
money securities through sophisticated and risky derivatives / block operations. Nevertheless,
such block trading seems to be sometimes facilitated by the cross-listing of the securities on
a transparent market generating reference-prices (Gresse & Jacquillat 1998). Second, unin-
formed investors prefer trading in markets with strict listing criteria (imposing high levels of
disclosure) when informed investors prefer lower-level ones. Exchanges must make a trade-off
between these demands and the characteristics of issuable securities: firm insiders are not keen
professionals improves price discovery since small traders can obtain the best price.
4Theoretically, an almost free entry market draws its stability from the high dispersion of trading activity
among the participants. A member’s default would not have systemic consequences given its small size despite
the eventual counterparties’ and clients’ uninsured losses.
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to disclose information about their business because they hope exploiting it on the market.
Financial intermediaries with better information on some securities (e.g. on geographically
distant issuers) may prefer trading them on opaque market for the same reason. Neverthe-
less, firms may list on strict-listing-criteria exchange if the insiders’ benefits from “bonding”
(mainly liquidity) are higher than the gains from their private information (Coffee Jr 2002),
a balance depending on their preference for liquidity5. High tech firms present specific prob-
lems: their short records, the uncertainty and the complexity inherent to innovation make
risk assessment difficult. Then, high disclosure and transparent exchanges attracting unin-
formed investors are likely to be (very) prudent about the listing of new technologies. This
confirms that not only the trading system transparency level but also the listing criteria create
scope for fragmentation. In line with this argument, Foucault & Parlour (2004) analyse the
competition between two stock exchanges for IPO. The exchanges compete on the basis of a
combination of listing policy, trading system, and listing fees. Competition leads exchanges to
differentiate themselves according to this combination and can co-exist because entrepreneurs
with different preferences list on different exchanges.
Moreover, from a strictly organisational point of view, the goal of exchanges under mutual
form is to maximize the rents members gain from the organization. To maximize their rents,
members must limit entry of operators. This limitation prevents the exchange from trading
all the stocks issued on the financial market. The organized exchange will trade the most
liquid and safe securities, leaving the other outside. On the other side, uninformed traders
tend to concentrate on high disclosure, transparent and restricted-access markets thanks to
the guarantees they offer. It attracts large investors. Nevertheless, the small (fixed) number
of traders affects the process of investors’ orders. It diverts the order flows toward competi-
tor exchanges. The coexistence of different market is often explained in terms of capacity
constraints (White 2013). On the one hand, this hypothesis does not fully explain either the
success or the microstructures of loose-organization markets. On the other, capacity con-
straints can be pushed back by the organization of the securities industry: first, orders can
be collected by intermediaries with large networks (banks) for a commission and not only by
the market members themselves; second, an increase in the number of traders is not strictly
required to deal with an increase in the volume of trade: actually, the traders’ cognitive limits
and the socialization that trading at a pit creates can limit the effectiveness (Baker 1984); at
the same increasing the number of pits on the floor also help to make elastic the constraint
on the number of listed securities.
5After Jensen & Meckling (1976), several authors developed the “bonding hypothesis”: the issuers listing
on high-disclosure exchange send a quality signal to uninformed investors that will buy their securities creating
liquidity; the exchange then attracts also the informed investors, thanks to the opportunity to sell large issues;
in return, higher liquidity lowers the cost of capital for the issuers. This virtuous circle would lead to a single
exchange.
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3 The steep way to the boom (1866-1881)
In 1845, after long struggles against both the local merchant power represented by the
Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie in Lyon and the political power exercised by the Min-
istry of Finance, the Lyon Stock Exchange is finally allowed to set up an organized market
(a parquet) within the stock exchange, that is a specific floor were the official stockbrokers,
the agents de change, could trade6. Lyon is the first provincial financial center in France to
obtain the right to establish a parquet. At that time, the number of stockbrokers, which is
allowed to trade at the Lyon Stock Exchange, is fixed at thirty by a numerus clausus. The
parquet is a negotiation space open under the scrutiny of the public. More precisely, with the
establishment of the parquet, negotiations are now conducted, as at the Paris Bourse, under
specific rules in a fixed time and thanks to an “outcry” auction process in order to ensure
fair and transparent prices. These prices are thus said to be official and authentic, which are
published in a specific newspaper: the official list. Indeed, before the setting up of the parquet,
prices were the result of bilateral negotiations made directly in stockbrokers’ private offices
or in a room closed to the public (Genevet 1890). In a report sent to the Minister of Trade
(Ministre du commerce et des travaux publics) in 1833, the stockbrokers insist particularly
on the abuses caused by those bilateral negotiations, especially as far as forward operations
are concerned. For example, they report cases where some investors managed to publish false
prices for their own benefit (Compagnie des Agents de Change de Lyon 1833).
During the early years following the setting up of the parquet, the Lyon Stock Exchange
grows up in the shadow of the Paris Bourse. Investors in Lyon were particularly dependent
on information sent by the capital. Indeed, at that time, communication technologies are far
from being very efficient. According to a contemporary author, the Lyon Stock Exchange is
the“vassal”of the Paris Bourse, because prices produced in Lyon rely on information provided
by Paris (Me´riclet 1859, p. 12). At this stage, it is difficult to provide formal evidence on that
issue. Nevertheless, it appears that the core securities of the Lyon Stock Exchange are also
cross-listed on the Paris official market: Cre´dit Mobilier, Cre´dit Mobilier Espagnol, Austrian
railroads, Ottoman and Italian public debt, etc.
Nevertheless, the Lyon Stock Exchange gradually grows up over the first few years. The
year 1862 is important for two reasons: first, the Lyon Bourse leaves its small room in the
Palais Saint-Pierre and moves into the newly built Palais du Commerce. Second, a decree
by the Emperor Napole´on III confirms the role of provincial exchanges, which confirms the
situation of Lyon stockbrokers.
1866 is a crucial point in the history of the Lyon Stock Exchange. This is why we start
our narrative to the analysis of these events. Events, that happen this year, influence the next
fifteen years in the history of the Lyon Stock Exchange. In 1866 alone, four stockbrokers are
6The very first official application by the Compagnie des agents de change de Lyon dates back to 1823.
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forced to resign. These failures are the result of the extreme and unanticipated volatility on
Italian public bonds in the summer of 18667. In a tense international context, the Italian rente
5% drops in June, before rising sharply in early July. As a consequence, the stockbrokers who
sold forward this security are in trouble. In Lyon, the four failures leave a debt of 880,829.73
francs8 . This amount is so large that the stock exchange committee cannot apply the old
rule against this kind of scenario. Indeed with the old practice, losses have to be born by the
stockbrokers who conduct business with the failed agent. The problem with this practice is
that the fall of the four stockbrokers would have led to fall of the others through a domino
effect. In addition to the survival of the Lyon Stock Exchange and to the reduction of the
systemic risk, the new principle is adopted in order to calm down public opinion and not to
deteriorate more the reputation of the Lyon Stock Exchange9. A new principle is adopted:
one decides to “support through the profit and loss account, the losses that result from agents
who remained debtors to their fellow brokers”. The idea is to introduce, only to some extent,
solidarity among stockbrokers. The objective is that the common fund reaches 1.2 million of
francs in 1868. Indeed the solidarity among agents is said to be “voluntary and limited”. It is
limited to the amount of the common fund. The agents strongly reject the idea that solidarity
could be enshrined in internal rules. The stock exchange committee sells its French rentes
and allocates all the funds available for the resolution of this crisis. To finance the deficit left
by the four agents, it decides to increase the internal tax, which finances the organization of
the exchange, on the turnover of some securities, such as Italian public bonds.
At the same time, it is decided that forward operations should be monitored more closely.
The exchange committee wished to revise its own internal rules in this direction, but it was
not possible since the forward operations are officially banned until 1885. The exchange
adopts a standardized form for partnership agreements following the example of the Paris
Stock Exchange. Finally, a register is created to track unfair debtors (registre des mauvais
de´biteurs).
While the Lyon Stock Exchange tries to recover from the disasters of 1866, two new fail-
ures occur in the course of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. This time, the debt left by the
agents reaches 731,585.60 francs. This new crisis reinforces the principle of the need of a
“voluntary and limited solidarity”. But again, the Lyon stockbrokers are really reluctant to
follow this principle (and they will stay reluctant through the rest of the 19th and the 20th
centuries).
Between 1866 and 1873, three seats are systematically vacant. The exchange committee
worries about this situation. Indeed, it negatively influences seat prices, as supply exceeds
demand, because the expected future revenues of brokers fall. Before the 1866 crisis, the
7In Marseille, two stockbrokers were forced to resign in the aftermath of the crisis. The stock exchange
Committee exhausted its common funds and have to borrow to survive (Gontard 1982).
8This amount refers to the debt of the four stockbrokers against their fellow brokers.
9Voices have been regularly raised since 1845 especially in the municipality of Lyon to challenge the
existence of the parquet.
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median of the seat price is 245.000 francs, while in 1869 and 1871 it is only 110.000 francs
(see figure 1). Partial data on seat prices before the establishment of the parquet provided by
Genevet (1890) suggest that prices of 1865 cannot be considered as outliers. It also reflects
how unattractive the profession of agent de change is in Lyon at that time.
The late 1870s is more favorable to the Lyon Stock Exchange. On the one hand, it is able
to recover part of the debts left by failed agents. On the other hand, it managed to create
a substantial common fund. The target of 1.2 million of francs decided in 1868 is reached in
1876. As a consequence, seat prices systematically increase from 1874 on. The median price
in 1865 is exceeded in 1878 (figure 1). At this time, no seat is vacant. There are two forced
resignations in 1877, but the exchange committee manages the situation without problem.
It points out the exchange’s good financial situation. On the other words, it collects enough
revenues from the internal tax to finance its activity.
The late 1870s are characterized by a boom, both economic and financial. At the national
level, the Freycinet Plan, an ambitious public works program launched in 1878, stimulates
economic activity. At the same time, many banks and other caisses de reports (houses spe-
cialized in “repo” operations) are set up and grew up thanks to capital increases. A few years
later, Le´on Say estimates that all the securities issued in France only for the year 1882 rep-
resent 7 billions of francs (Say (1886) quoted by Bouvier (1960)).
The years 1881 and 1882 deeply mark the French financial history and especially the
history of the city of Lyon. Indeed, the boom and the bust, which follows, were mainly
concentrated on the shares of two companies thoroughly established in the Lyon region: the
Banque de Lyon et de la Loire, founded by Charles Savary, and the Union Ge´ne´rale, led by
Euge`ne Bontoux. Our goal here is not to give a detailed account of the events of those two
years, but rather to provide a “view from the floor”10 of them using primary sources and thus
to complement the classical account of the Union Ge´ne´rale crash by Bouvier (1960).
Then 1881 is a year of intense speculation. The particular setting of the Lyon stock mar-
ket amplifies this phenomenon. First, it is possible in Lyon to trade forward with lots of five
securities, while at the Paris Bourse forward operations are only related to multiples of 25
securities. As a result, it was much easier for investors to trade forward in Lyon. In particular,
these operations were not reserved only to wealthy investors. In addition, it was possible to
trade in an informal way at settlement dates not written on the official list. Usually in French
stock exchanges, in order to reduce counterparty risk, it is allowed to trade forward up to two
months for the more liquid securities. But, at the Lyon Stock Exchange, as in the Coulisse,
the investors could sign forward contracts with a settlement date for a term of several months,
which in turn increases counterparty risk. As the forward operations represent nearly 90% of
all transactions carried out by the agents de change, we guess the terrible consequences that
risk taken in the forward operations could lead for the Lyon Stock Exchange. The local finan-
10To paraphrase White (2011).
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cial press also stimulated the speculation with its emphasis on particular and very successful
stories11. The Lyon agents de change seem to be blameworthy. Indeed they took a great part
in the creation of the caisses de report12 and engaged themselves excessively in repo opera-
tions. In addition, the stockbrokers take over the unofficial market set up at the beginning of
the 1880s. Finally, we have to emphasis the role played by a new communication technology,
that is the telegraph. The exchange committee began discussions with the executive authority
in charge of the telegraph in November 1871 in order to establish a telegraph office directly in
the Palais du commerce. After long discussions, two direct wires are laid between the Palais
Brongniart (Paris) and the Palais du Commerce (Lyon) on December 1st, 1880. Fully aware
of the impact of this facility has on its business, the exchange committee agreed to spend more
than 130.000 francs for the establishment of the connection, which alone represents nearly 1.6
times the amount of all expenses for the year 1880. With these direct wires, “a few minutes
[are needed] to receive and send orders from Paris”13. Undoubtedly, this new technology led
to an increase in operations in the Lyon Stock Exchange. One thus understand the words of
Edouard Aynard, a famous banker and politician in Lyon, according to which Lyon in 1881
was transformed into “a vast Quincampoix street” (Aynard 1889, p. 13).
Using the “commissions” as proxy for the volume of the transactions in a stock exchange,
we find that 1881 corresponds to the Golden Age of the Lyon Stock Exchange (figure 3). The
amount of the commissions is multiplied by 3 between 1879 and 1881. 1881 is the first (and
only) time that the Lyon market share (compared to Paris) exceeds 10% (figures 2 and 4).
The crash starts in early January 1882, after that (bad) news on investments by the
Banque de Lyon et de la Loire spread among investors. A few days after, some stockbrokers
suffer from difficulties. After carrying out an informal inquiry, on January 12, 1882 the ex-
change committee calls Allizon and Jacquet, two agents de change, to carefully display their
financial positions. The exchange committee asked them for “liquidating [their positions] in
the two days that follow”14. Other agents de change decided, without the express consent of
the stock exchange committee, to rescue their two fellows in the two days. In particular they
guaranteed their operations on the repo market. On January 16, the stock exchange commit-
tee formally decides not to intervene because “the common interests of the exchange do not
allow it to provide an effective support”15. Indeed, the reserves of the exchange are already
well underway. On January 17, a judicial liquidator is appointed to lead the liquidation of
the two failed stockbrokers. The day of January 19 is “decisive” (Bouvier 1960, p. 143): while
11In an article published in Le Figaro (23/01/1882) after the crash of the Union Ge´ne´rale, the journalist
Pierre Giffard traces back this phenomenon and provides some examples: one wigmaker made 50.000 francs
and stopped working; one bank clerk (commis de banque) won 800.000 francs and spent the rest of his life
smoking cigars in front of the Mediterranean Sea; etc.
12This is for instance the case for the “Caisse Lyonnaise”, a caisse des reports founded by Charles Savary
and five stockbrokers (Bouvier 1960, p. 124–125).
13CAC Lyon, minutes, general assembly, 29/12/1880.
14CAC Lyon, minutes, committee meeting, 12/01/1882.
15CAC Lyon, minutes, committee meeting, 16/01/1882.
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the settlement is in full swing, the 500 francs shares of the Union Ge´ne´rale starts at 2000
francs and ends at 1460 francs, that is a 27% decrease in a few hours16. The exchange cannot
support payments: the stock exchange closes on 19 at night. After the crash, one estimates
that the inter-brokers debt amounts to 63.7 millions of francs and the total debt caused by
the financial crash reaches 191 millions of francs!
4 The hard recovery after the crash (1882-1898)
The crash of 1882 hit the Paris Bourse, the Lyon Stock Exchange and the Coulisse, but the
fate of the three exchanges is different: the Paris Bourse is bailed out by the Bank of France
and goes through the liquidity crisis, the Coulisse – actually a badly known story – leaves
debts to its clients while the Lyon Stock Exchange collapses and is re-founded. Nevertheless,
the Coulisse, as a financial phoenix, arises from its ashes and competes successfully during the
1880s with the Paris Bourse, which knows a deep institutional crisis. At the very beginning
of the 1890s the Coulisse already handles two thirds of the Parisian trading volumes. The
Lyon Stock Exchange profits from the Coulisse’s activity and starts a hard recovery. New
regulations passed between 1890 and 1892 harm the Paris Bourse vis-a`-vis the Coulisse, but
at the same time the Lyon Stock Exchange vis-a`-vis the Paris Bourse: if the negative effect
on Lyon is noticeable, the positive effect on the Paris Bourse is overwhelmed by the loss of
some competitive hedges vis-a`-vis the Coulisse. For this reason, the triumph of the Coulisse
is not the triumph of the Lyon Stock Exchange: a new fiscal law in practice abolishes in 1893
the monopoly of the official stockbrokers on the officially listed securities. The activity in
the Coulisse spikes between 1894 and 1895, without driving the activity of Lyon at the same
pace. Nevertheless, the financial and regulatory blows that the Coulisse suffer between 1895
and 1900 drive down the activity in Lyon, more exposed to the competition from a renewed
Paris Bourse.
After the closing on January 19 1882, the Lyon Stock Exchange re-opens on January 23
but only for spot operations on which the stockbrokers bear smaller risks. On February 18, a
new committee is appointed. The exchange committee’s priority is to avoid official bankrupt-
cies of the stockbrokers and thereafter bankruptcy of the stock exchange itself. However,
the stockbrokers played a waiting game: stockbrokers are indeed confident in future judicial
verdicts and they are in no hurry to sign a composition (concordat) with their creditors. For
instance, debtors hope that the last capital increase of the Union Ge´ne´rale will simply be
cancelled because of irregularities. In this case, operations on these shares could be declared
null and void. This attitude deeply annoys the Minister of Finance, Le´on Say. He did not
want the government to intervene because, according to him, the losses of the Lyon Stock
Exchange were considered as purely private. However, facing the inaction of the agents de
16All these prices are spot prices at the Paris official Bourse.
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change, Le´on Say warns that the courts power could hit, even if it has been merciful for the
moment. Le´on Say also requires the exchange five resignations. On February 17, 1882, he
sent an envoy to the Lyon Stock Exchange. It reminds stockbrokers who gathered in general
assembly that the Minister has asked for 5 heads before February 18, and invited the stock-
brokers to “think about the difference between a voluntary resignation and a brutal official
dismissal”17. Fearing disastrous reputational effects on themselves and on the whole exchange
of a dismissal, five agents de change resign: the former head of the committee (the Syndic),
two of his assistants (the adjoints au Syndic), and the two stockbrokers that suspended their
payments by mid-January. On 25 March 1882, a decree deletes three offices and reduces de
jure the numerus clausus. As a result, the number of Lyon stockbrokers is 27 at the most.
Thus, the government decides not to intervene to rescue the Lyon Stock Exchange. The
Parisian high-profile private bankers, the so-called Haute Banque, is no more cooperative
with Lyon while the Paris Bourse receives two successive external loans. The Haute Banque
of Lyon is also embroiled in severe difficulties, which prevented it from giving any support to
the Lyon Stock Exchange. Moreover it seems that anyway the government has banned the
Lyon Exchange from taking out an external loan, while it allowed Paris to do so. The Paris
exchange received indeed two external loans: one from a consortium of banks led by the Bank
of France (80 millions of francs) and another granted by the bank Rothschild (18 millions of
francs). Thanks to the Parisian stockbrokers’ personal wealth and the wealth of their social
network, these two loans are rapidly paid back. The crisis in the Paris Bourse is thus more a
liquidity crisis than a systemic crisis (White 2007). As for the Coulisse, the outside brokers,
called the coulissiers leave debts to their clients.
How can we explain this difference in treatment between the two official exchanges? Sev-
eral reasons have been put forward, but none has been fully convincing. A first explanation
given by contemporaries is that Lyon, which is said to be run by conservative elites, was
punished by the center-left government. Another and more economically-based hypothesis
relies on excessive risks taken by Lyon stockbrokers. For instance, stockbrokers never require
their clients to deposit cash or securities when involved in forward, especially repo, opera-
tions. Some stockbrokers, involved in the caisse de report, encouraged these repo operations
(see above). In addition, the stockbrokers carried out activities outside their monopoly. Lyon
official stockbrokers have the control of the Lyon OTC market where a fierce speculation takes
place on securities issued by companies run by Euge`ne Bontoux. Thus the government’s de-
cision would be a way to send to clear signal and reduce moral hazard in the future.
Restoring fully the Lyon Stock Exchange requires two conditions. The reorganization of
the brokerage houses is the first: the 25 agents de change, who have not resigned, face two
options. The first is to sell the office. This solution has been chosen by seven stockbrokers.
The selling prices of the office are then between 50,000 and 75,000 francs, while the last price
17CAC Lyon, minutes, general assembly, 17/02/1882.
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of 1881 had reached 425,000 francs, which means a depreciation of at least 80% (figure 1)!
The recapitalization of the brokerage houses is the second option: the agents de change could
call their partners for more money, or they could find new partners. Eighteen agents have
chosen this second option. When enough agents are ready, the forward market re-opens
(15/05/1882).
The next priority is to deal with the huge debt left by the crash of January 1882, the
stock exchange committee decides to issue bonds, called “Bons de de´le´gation de la Caisse
Syndicale”, which bear a nominal value of 500 francs and no interest. These bonds are spread
among all the agents according to their net position vis-a`-vis their fellow brokers. In turn
each agent has to spread the bonds among his clients. In total, in May 1882, 101,547 bonds
were issued for a total of 50,773,500 francs18. Each quarter, an amout is dedicated to the
reimbursement of these bonds. These funds come mainly from a special tax on the trading
(30%). Reimbursement is made according to an auction process. Each quarter, each bearer
submits bids in one sealed envelope for the reimbursement of his bonds. The winners are
those who proposed the lowest price. If there is no offer at less than 500 francs or if part of
the amount dedicated to the bonds reimbursement is left, then bonds are redeemed at par
through a drawing of lots.
The figure 6 describes the evolution of bonds reimbursement during the period 1883-
191019. Several results can be drawn from the observation of the curve. First, it reflects the
strong pessimism that prevails just after the crash. Indeed, in July 1883, one agrees to receive
135 francs for a debt worth 500 francs that is only 27% of the nominal value. Nevertheless,
the average reimbursement price follows a bullish trend. This suggests the greater optimism
of agents while the debt is extinguished. It also reflects the general position of the stock
exchange. When it gets better, the average reimbursement price is steadily increasing, as it
is the case between 1885 and 1893. However, prices fall as difficulties rise, as after 1893. The
extinction of the debt happens in 1910, that is 28 years after the crash of the Union Ge´ne´rale.
Nevertheless we have to stress that in 1904 the situation does not seem to worry the stock
exchange committee, since it wonders whether to anticipate the final reimbursement could
be a good policy or not. This manifests itself in an average price of reimbursement at par
and the low volumes that can be seen after 1905. Moreover it is clear from the figure 1 that
the rise in the seat price after 1883 goes hand in hand with the decrease in the debt burden.
In other words, the expected future profits of each agent de change increases as debt service
falls.
The 1880s sees the rise of the Coulisse. After 1882, the Paris Stock Exchange loses its
competitive hedge vis-a`-vis the Coulisse because of a combination of internal decisions and
new regulations. First, after the hard blow of 1882, the Paris official stockbrokers are no
18This is less than the inter-brokers (63.7 millions of francs), because the Caisse syndicale received cash
from some of its debtors in the meantime.
19Although decided in May 1882, the first reimbursement took place in July 1883.
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more ready to accept the moral hazard that the common solidarity among them could gener-
ate neither the subsequent payments for the debt of their fellow brokers. The Paris Bourse’s
committee imposes losses to the clients of two defaulting brokers, respectively in 1886 and
1888. The decision to renounce to the common solidarity makes the Paris Bourse more similar
to the Coulisse. Second, the 1882 crash shows the systemic dangers of the forward operations’
illegality. Illegality of forward operations creates juridical risks because brokers were not sure
to suit successfully clients unwilling to pay: even if jurisprudence tried to harmonize practices
and law, the free appreciation of each judge does not allow courts to be a sufficient threat
over unwilling clients. As a consequence, investors could be tempted to speculate without
paying their debts (Lagneau-Ymonet & Riva 2011).
After the blow, the government passes a law legalizing them in 1885. This law is more
beneficial for the Coulisse than for the Paris Bourse because the latter was benefiting from a
more favorable jurisprudence that the former in front of the courts (Lagneau-Ymonet & Riva
2011). Third, a judgment of the higher French Civil Court of 1885 limits the monopoly of the
official stockbrokers to the officially listed securities, against a constant jurisprudence from
the very beginning of the XIX century. This decision makes the trades of the coulissiers on
unlisted securities legal, reducing therefore the juridical risk of their operations: clients of the
Coulisse could be tempted to refuse to pay their debts because the trade with the coulissiers
did not respect the law on the brokers’ monopoly (Hautcoeur & Riva 2012).
The rise of the Coulisse drives the Lyon Stock Exchange’s activity. “The Coulisse... [is]
our best client”, said the head of the Lyon Stock Exchange. The organization of the trad-
ing sessions at the Lyon Stock Exchange has been built to be the ideal complement of Paris
Bourse. The coulissiers largely used Lyon as counterparty for their operations of arbitrage
on highly liquid securities like the mines (and not just gold) as well as the main interna-
tional publics bonds. The Lyon Stock Exchange opens at 11:00 and closes at 12:30, when
the Paris Bourse starts the trading. The overlap between the Lyon Stock Exchange morning
session and the opening of the Coulisse allows the latter to send orders to Lyon and receive
the confirmation of the execution before the beginning the Paris Bourse. This arrangement
gives the coulissiers opportunities to shunt cross-listed securities and, at least according the
Parisian official stockbrokers, to affect the opening prices of the Paris Bourse via Lyon: the
Lyon closing prices for securities officially cross-listed between Lyon and the Paris Bourse are
indeed “official” and reported on the Lyon official lists.
This arbitrage was facilitated by several factors. The first one is the listing policy of Lyon:
all the securities officially listed at the Paris Bourse are tradable at the Lyon Stock Exchange,
even if only a limited number finds place on the Lyon official lists: among them, all the main
international bonds that are the object of a fierce competition between the Coulisse and the
Paris Bourse. Second, the Lyon Stock Exchange takes the control in 1881 over the OTC mar-
ket in Lyon to avoid the setting up of a Coulisse in the financial center. From then onwards,
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this OTC market run by the official stockbrokers is an important source of business for them
thanks to the trading of securities only quoted at the Coulisse, mainly mines stocks. Third,
the improvement of the information technologies linking Paris and Lyon: the success of Lyon
is so important in the late 1880s that often the transmissions of telegrams through the two
wires the Stock Exchange financed in 1880 were delayed because of overcrowding. For this
reason, the Lyon Stock Exchange asks the government for a third direct wire unless being
able to finance it because of its 1882 debts. It obtains in 1889 that all the free resources of
the telegraphic network will be devoted to the stock exchange during the trading session. In
the same year, the need of more effective communications between Paris and Lyon pushes the
Lyon Stock Exchange to ask for and attain the installation of a telephone in the exchange
building. Fifth, the coulissiers not only are in touch with the operators in Lyon thanks to
the IT, but they have appointed correspondents in the financial center.
Moreover, in order to profit from the closing prices of the Paris Bourse and trading on
the basis of its prices with the coulissiers, the Lyon Stock Exchange organizes from the early
1880s an evening session at 5 pm that is so successful that Lyon brokers in 1888 ask for
and attain a one-hour extension in order to execute all the orders they receive. This session
allows traders to take positions to be hedged in the Coulisse’s evening session. From the late
1870s, the Coulisse organizes its evening sessions, previously held on the street, in the hall
of the Cre´dit Lyonnais. The Cre´dit Lyonnais provides the trading room and other facilities
for free to the Coulisse thanks to the information for its proprietary trading it gets from the
close observation of the trading flows. This evening session is so important that has effects
at international levels: the Genoa Stock Exchange for instance organizes an evening session
opening when the telegram with the prices of this market reaches the financial center; it raises
the envy of the Milan Stock Exchange that does not benefit from a post office open up to
midnight as Genoa does. After the blow of 1882, this evening session recovers very soon its
importance: in 1885, the Paris Bourse sees it as a major competitive hedge of the Coulisse.
Nevertheless, a regulatory change at the very beginning the 1890s reduces the positive
influence that the Coulisse’s activity has on the Lyon Stock Exchange. After the legalization
of the forward operations in 1885, the government passes the decree regulating the securities
trading in 1890, promised by the Commercial Code of 1807. The regulations of 1890 have an
ambiguous effect on the on the competitive position of the Paris Bourse. The Paris Bourse
lobbied hard the government to obtain the decree: it was the guarantee that the rules of the
exchange would be binding not only for official stockbrokers but also for their clients. The
decree recognizes extensively the previous rules of the offcial market and gives to the stock
exchanges’ activity an official seal. However, the government imposes to the exchanges heavier
regulatory burdens than the previous self-regulations, making them more rigid and homoge-
neous in their organization. As a consequence, the Coulisse takes even more advantages from
its flexibility, increasing its competitive hedge vis-a`-vis the Paris Bourse (Lagneau-Ymonet &
15
Riva 2012). On the contrary, the increasing homogeneity of the exchanges allows the Paris
Bourse to attract the activity of the Lyon Stock Exchange: the Lyon market share stops to
increase and the commissions in absolute terms spikes in 1890 (see figures 2, 3 and 4).
The homogenization of the French stock exchanges progresses remarkably thanks to the
prescriptive work of the Ministry of Finance between 1890 and 1892. The stock exchanges
have to adapt their internal rules to a new national ones and must submit them to the ratifi-
cation of the Ministry of Finance. After a hard and long negotiation between the Ministry of
Finance and the Paris Bourse for the internal rules of the latter, the former imposes to the
regional exchanges to model their own rules on the Paris ones. Higher is the homogeneity
among the French official markets, higher is the attractiveness of the Paris one thanks to the
externality of its liquidity, even if it is losing market shares vis-a`-vis the Coulisse and the
Coulisse supplies activity to the Lyon Stock Exchange.
In order to contrast the Coulisse, the Paris Bourse in 1892 on the one hand anticipates
its opening at 12:00 and, on the other hand, makes pressures over the regulators to attain
the closing of the evening session in the Cre´dit Lyonnais building, at that time a very well-
organized and liquid market. The Paris Bourse opens its doors at the noon to capture the
orders’ flow on international bonds the Coulisse trades with the help of Lyon. The Lyon Stock
Exchange tries to react to this challenge. It anticipates its opening to 10:45 and maintains the
closing at 12:30 pm to benefit from the orders of foreign clients reaching the market around
the noon: by this way, the Lyon clients still have the time to get the confirmation of the
orders’ execution before the opening of the Paris Bourse.
At the same time, the Lyon brokers ask for the reopening of the evening session, closed
because of the Parisian pressures and the 1890 regulations: even if the regulation does not
explicitly forbid after-hours sessions, it makes an evening session run by official stockbrokers
difficult to defend in front of the regulators because opposite to the rationale of the rules. In
spite of the opposition of the head of the exchange who resigns at this occasion, the Lyon
Stock Exchange reopens the session with the authorization of the local authorities. Neverth-
less, the Lyon Stock Exchange cannot take the most of it because very soon the Paris Bourse
attains the closing of the evening session of the Coulisse in the hall of the Cre´dit Lyonnais
after a long and intensive fight against the bank and a hard lobbying. From 1889, the Paris
Bourse starts its campaign against the evening session of the Coulisse, but it cannot convince
the Ministry of Finance given the role of this market in the Paris financial center and the
power of the Cre´dit Lyonnais. The Bourse cannot win the opposition of the bank even when
it declares it as an “enemy” of the Bourse and forbids the brokers to grant any rebates to
it. At that point, the Paris Bourse starts the procedure to suit the Cre´dit Lyonnais and the
coulissiers in front of the courts. To avoid a juridical litigation, the government imposes the
closing of the Cre´dit Lyonnais’ doors, but tolerates the transfer of the market on the street.
It is reasonable to assume that without the organization the Cre´dit Lyonnais provides the
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trading volumes of this market decrease.
This is why the triumph of the Coulisse does not correspond to the triumph of the Lyon
Stock Exchange. A new fiscal law in practice abolishes in 1893 the monopoly of the Paris
ones. This fiscal law establishes a financial transaction tax: it allows the coulissiers to pay
the tax over the transactions on officially listed securities and legalize them, reducing the
juridical risk over most of the transactions of these operators. Up to 1893, the coulissiers
were not entitled to suit the clients unwilling to pay in front of the courts if officially listed
securities were the object of the contract.
The new law is passed in the context of huge financial scandals (the Comptoir d’Escompte
goes bankrupt in 1889 and the Panama scandal burst in 1892) leading the government to
find a way to monitor the market: the financial transaction tax would have been a kind of
“registration tax” to enhance to transparency of the market and mainly of its darker side,
the Coulisse, while long lasting debates led by free-market economists from the 1882 crash
onwards over the organization of the Paris financial market pointed out the virtues of a level
playing field in the Paris financial center. The institutional weakness of the Paris Bourse, due
to harming internal decisions and external regulations, prevent the official stockbrokers from
an effective lobbying.
The banks play an important role in the regulatory debate: they support the Coulisse
because of the important services it offers to them and the change in the solidarity regime
decided by the Paris Bourse. First, the Coulisse is an opaque trading venue where the banks
can exploit their superior information; second, on the primary market, the coulissiers are
entitled to buy important blocks of newly issued securities and sell them progressively on the
market, fuelling the underwriting activity of banks and bankers. Third, the dual capacity of
the coulissiers confers immediacy to their market. Least but not last, the end of the common
solidarity among official stockbrokers weakens the safety of the Paris Bourse for the investors.
The regulatory change paves the way to a speculative boom in the Coulisse – the gold mines
mania – and its activity spikes between 1894 and 1895, when the volumes traded in Lyon are
already decreasing (Hautcoeur et al. 2010).
5 The (not so) “Belle E´poque” for Lyon (1895-1913)
The Belle E´poque is not as beautiful for the Lyon Stock Exchange. First, the Lyon Stock
Exchange is experiencing the setbacks of his “best customer”, the Coulisse, hit by the crisis
of gold mines and mainly by the reorganization of the market in 1898. Then, the position of
regulator of the national market the reform of 1898 has awarded the Paris Bourse encourages
other exchanges to align their microstructures to that of the capital. This alignment in turn
promotes the externalities and the centralization of the activity in the most liquid market:
Paris. Finally, the Lyon Bourse is exposed, like other French exchanges, to the increasing
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competition of banks on the primary market. On the other hand, banks centralize in the
Paris Bourse their trading activity to benefit from externalities, reinforced by the specific
benefits Paris stockbrokers granted them in 1898. The Lyon Exchange can survive by devel-
oping a niche away from its rival: it develops an unofficial market, a kind of special settlement,
devoted to local stocks. Moreover, it is able to maintain the OTC market it controls from the
beginning of the 1880s, managed directly by the official brokers.
The Lyon Exchange suffered the repercussions of his “best customer”’s setbacks, the
Coulisse, hit by the crisis of gold mines and mainly by the reorganization of the market
in 1898. The boom in gold mining marks the apogee of the Coulisse. The gold mining com-
panies established in England issue, between 1894 and 1895, an impressive flow of securities
that the operators of the Coulisse channel to Paris: authorized to purchase on their own
account, the coulissiers absorb important blocks of securities and sell them progressively on
their market. It is a source of activity the regulations indirectly reserve to them: the securities
of English gold mines do not meet the legal criteria for listing of foreign securities top the
Paris Bourse.
Speculation knows its climax and at the liquidation of October 1895, many coulissiers are
declared insolvent due to a sudden reversal of the gold mines’ market. The price drop is am-
plified due to failure and sudden withdrawal of support that banks were giving to coulissiers.
Many observers considered the coulissiers had developed the market on gold mines shares
very speculatively: most of the shares did not comply with French regulations, the market
was opaque and the information on the firms was very limited. Despite these limitations, and
thanks to a huge media campaign, hundreds of millions worth of securities had been sold to
the general public, whose losses were enormous. As the figure 4 shows, the decline in the
Lyon activity started at the time of the gold mines crisis.
This crisis facilitated a campaign by the Parquet of Paris against foreign brokers and their
unsecure markets20, which fell well in a period of populist and xenophobic attacks against the
Jews and their international (worse: German) connections making them insufficiently loyal to
the country21. The 1895 crisis was not the only argument of the Paris Bourse pushing toward
the restoration of the monopoly. First, the Paris Bourse restored the collective guarantee
between 1895 and 1896 at the occasion of the failure of three official brokers, re-establishing
an important competitive edge vis-a`-vis Lyon and the Coulisse as well as its raison d’eˆtre
vis-a`-vis the French regulators. Second, the government ascertained the coulissiers’ fiscal
evasion of the financial transaction tax established in 1893. Third, the Paris Bourse offered
to the banks important facilities to break the Coulisse-banks alliance surrounding the 1893
regulation. These factors led the Government to restore and protect the monopoly of the
20The Parquet had already used similar arguments in 1893, when it helped the publication of the list of
the members of the Coulisse mentioning their nationality and that of their backers or partners: many were
Germans. See La Re´forme Economique, supple´ment, March 23rd, 1893.
21The famous “J’accuse” article by Emile Zola in L’Aurore was published on January 13th, 1898, marking
the height of the Dreyfus affair.
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Paris Bourse in 1898 by changing the financial transactions tax. From then onwards, only
the official stockbrokers were entitled to pay the tax on the transactions on officially listed
securities (Hautcoeur et al. 2010).
As a compensation, the Parquet was supposed to improve its services: delivery delays
were reduced, new negotiation groups were created (which would allow hiring some former
coulissiers), new kind of (derivatives) trades were introduced to attract the sophisticate in-
vestors previously clients of the Coulisse, and the Paris Stock Exchange committee was to
support the Association nationale des porteurs franc¸ais de valeurs mobilie`res (an investors’
lobby negotiating mostly with bankrupt foreign governments). The maximum commissions
were slashed and the minimum ones suppressed for small orders; the reduction in the com-
missions was to limit rents Parisian official stockbrokers gained from the monopoly, but it
created a competitive advantage for Paris vis-a`-vis Lyon; the new Parisian commissions were
well lower than the Lyon one and the brokers in Lyon pointed out many times the Parisian
attractiveness for their (potential) clients; nevertheless the brokers in Lyon were unable to
lower the commissions because of the debts cumulated in 1882.
Even more important, in Paris, ten new agents de change were created; solidarity among
the agents was made legal; from 1901, the price of agents de change offices was fixed by
the government – and maintained constant until World War One again to limit the rents of
the restored monopoly; moreover, important rebates were granted from the Parisian brokers
to all the players of the financial industry (coulissiers, official stockbrokers from provincial
exchanges, bankers and banks) to buy the consensus by sharing the rents of the restored
monopoly. Nevertheless, for the Coulisse, these rebates were not enough to compensate the
loss of business.
At the same time, the Coulisse was obliged through moral suasion by the government to
reorganize in two organizations (syndicats), respectively for spot and forward operations (the
second one being by far the most important). The government imposed them organizational
structures much more formalized than previously: membership criteria, listing requirements
and price discovery rules were set. The formalization of the Coulisse is likely to have left out
of its doors some securities that found a harbour in Lyon thanks to its new listing policy.
However, it was not until 1901 that the reform of 1898 comes fully into force. In fact, the
first reaction of coulissiers was a proud refusal: many of them had acquired Belgian statutes
and continued to negotiate in Paris sheltered from French regulations, when some were ac-
tually located in Brussels. In 1901, most of dissident coulissiers returned to the ranks after
a modus vivendi was signed between the Coulisse and the Paris Bourse. Under this modus
vivendi, the coulissiers were allowed to negotiate a set of highly liquid public and foreign se-
curities object of international arbitrage. The effect of the reform on the competition between
the Coulisse and the Paris Bourse is clear in the figure 5. The reform switched the trading
volumes of the Paris financial centre from the Coulisse to the Paris Bourse who benefited
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from 1898 onwards from the externalities of the liquidity previously favouring the Coulisse
(Hautcoeur et al. 2010). The Paris Bourse recovers an additional competitive advantage vis-
a`-vis Lyon. The Coulisse did not recover from this regulatory choc.
Reform of 1898 crowns the Paris Bourse as regulating the domestic market. It thus brings
the other exchanges to further align their microstructures to the official market of the capital
by pursuing the path initiated in 1892 after the government decree. The case of settlement
and delivery organization is emblematic: not only the Lyon Exchange layers the calendar of its
settlement and delivery system on that of Paris in 1903 but it uses directly the clearing price
made in Paris for the cross-listed securities. Admittedly, the Lyon Exchange imports from
Paris also important innovations that may improve its competitiveness, such as the creation
of a group where the clerks traded the officially admitted securities in 1899 and central clear-
ing of cash transactions in 1900. However, the homogenization of microstructures facilitates
the centralization of business in Paris: the most liquid market attracts the activity thanks
to externalities that heterogeneity is no more limiting. If this homogenization improves the
competitive position of the Paris Bourse, it also satisfies regulators that can, with the cen-
tralization of activity, exercise better control over the financial market.
The effects of the 1898 reform on the Lyon Stock Exchange Committee appear clearly
on the figures 3, 4 and 5. Not only from 1898 onwards the commissions cashed by the Lyon
brokers and their market share are experiencing a downward trend, but also the composition
of the trading volumes changes with an adverse effect on the profitability of operators Lyon.
Volumes on derivatives transactions in 1879 represented 90% of the volumes traded by the
Exchange of Lyon, when in 1899 they accounted for only 73% and known a further decrease
thereafter. In fact, the reorganization of the Paris Stock Exchange was designed especially to
get business from forward operators. The head of the Lyon Stock Exchange repeatedly un-
derscored increasing cash volumes, but a forward market languishing: under this perspective,
it compares the Lyon Stock Exchange to the Brussels’ one22. However, a stockbroker gets a
higher profit from forward operation than, from cash ones due to higher back-office-related
costs of the latter type of transaction. “We are the victims of the 1898 reform”, the head of
the Lyon Stock Exchange said23.
Then, the survival of the Lyon Stock Exchange is threatened by the actions of banks.
They enhance competition vis-a`-vis all French Exchanges on the primary market and cen-
tralize trading activity in Paris. On the primary market, credit institutions are increasingly
placing newly issued securities directly to their customers, without a public issue, as they
did much more often before, or a real IPO, as it is the rule in London. Following a private
issue, admission to the exchange is requested once the securities have already been placed in
the portfolios of retail investors. French Exchanges lose all activity, mainly the forward one,
accompanying public issues or IPOs (Hautcoeur & Riva 2012). From 1910, this banks’ action
22CAC Lyon, minutes, general assembly, 20/12/1906.
23CAC Lyon, minutes, general assembly, 19/12/1908.
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infringe less on the Paris Bourse than the Lyon Stock Exchange. After years of conflict, the
Paris Bourse enters into an agreement with the banks to participate fully in the syndicates of
large issues, including foreign government securities, and obtain the corresponding commis-
sions.
On the secondary market, the new organization of the Paris Bourse pushes banks to cen-
tralize trading activity on it at the expense of other French exchanges. Banks are attracted
not only by the Paris liquidity but also by the specific benefits the Paris Stock Exchange has
granted them. In addition to the rebates the banks obtained in 1898 also the so-called “par
contre”. Beyond the proprietary trading, the banks throughout their expanding branches’
networks were collecting important orders’ flows from their clients. They were centralizing
the orders in Paris, where the back-offices of the headquarters were handling the orders to
optimize them. This handling was allowing banks for sending to the Bourse matched orders.
The “par contre” is a rebate allowing to the bank to pay the commission only on the higher
side (buy or sell side) of a matched order. Given the organization of the banks, it was an
important source of savings on the commissions.
Nevertheless, the effect of the externalities of the Paris Bourse seems to be stronger that
the lower level of commissions. First, when the Lyon brokers were to pay back all the debts
cumulated in 1882, they offered to the banks to execute for free the orders collected in the
region; according the Lyon brokers the execution of these orders in Lyon would have brought a
cascade of orders thanks to forward arbitrage. The positive externalities should have been so
strong in Paris that the banks refused the offer. Second, when the“par contre”was suppressed
at the occasion of the agreement between Parisian brokers and banks in 1910, the trading
activity of the Lyon Stock Exchange did not know a significant change in magnitude, even
if a regain of activity is clear in 1912. Certainly, the Lyon Stock Exchange tries to attract
the trading of banks by other means decreasing their transactions costs. The main move in
this field is the direct inclusion of the main banks and bankers of the financial centre in the
settlement and delivery system of the Bourse: banks and bankers participate in on the same
grounds of the stockbrokers from 1900 onwards.
The Lyon Exchange, however, does survive by developing a niche it can operate away from
its Parisian rival. It develops a listing policy allowing it to list several local stocks, mainly to
the “Deuxie`me partie de la cote” (“second part of the official list”), a kind of special settle-
ment. This move allows Lyon to assert itself as the national market for local stocks. On the
other hand, the operators of the official stock exchange of Lyon are capable to maintain an
unofficial market where they trade French and foreign more speculative securities as mines.
Organizational specificities of these two markets and the kind of securities traded give to the
Lyon Stock Exchange a niche the Paris Bourse is not interested in.
We will explain how the stock exchange committee worked for admission to the list (espe-
cially to the second part) of a lot of local securities. To do so, it implemented the innovative
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views of Abel Waldmann, an agent de change with a PhD in law. It is the head of the com-
mittee himself, that announced, during the general assembly in late 1910, “the introduction to
our official list side of the pleiad of securities, known as local, feeds our transactions and allow
us to resist the constantly growing absorption of the Paris Bourse”24. Several reasons can
be advanced to explain the benefits that the Lyon Bourse derived from these local securities.
First, they are not subject to competition from Paris. The Lyon Stock Exchange is, to some
extent, a monopoly for the trading of this kind of securities. Because of the distance, it is
tough for Paris investors to get information on them. In addition, these securities are often
too small to interest the Paris official market. Second, some local securities may become very
successful. By admitting them early to the official list, the stock exchange committee con-
tributes to the spread of these securities especially among local investors, although most local
securities were illiquid and disappeared quickly from the official list. Once established, these
securities, although few in number, could then provide additional trading opportunities for
the Lyon Stock Exchange. This Compagnie des produits chimiques d’Alais et de Camargue,
which will be well known then as “Pechiney”, provides a typical example. Shares and bonds
of this company are listed at the Lyon Stock Exchange from at least 1898, whereas it will be
possible to trade these securities in Paris only after 1914. In 1938, R. Dubost confirms that
the securities of the company have preserved strong local roots and that they are also traded
in Lyon (Dubost 1938). At the same time, Pechiney is among the 40 highest capitalizations in
France (Le Bris & Hautcoeur 2010). Nevertheless, the bulk of the trading on some successful
securities moves to Paris after cross-listing with the Paris Bourse. Finally, to a more marginal
extent, companies which apply for listing have to pay an admission fee, while in the Paris
official market listing is for free. This practice deserves the Lyon Stock Exchange reprimands
from the Ministry of Finance25.
The listing policy allowing the admission of this pleiad of local securities has greatly ben-
efited from the views of Abel Waldmann. Abel Waldmann was appointed agent de change
on October 9, 1895. Emile Waldmann, agent de change between 1859 and 1881 and then
between 1882 and 188626, is his grandfather. The thesis by Abel Waldmann, devoted to the
“profession of the agent de change”, is published for the first time in 1888 (Waldmann 1888).
He elaborates a particular vision of the role of the agent de change in the admission of secu-
rities to the official list. His analysis is based on a personal interpretation of the Article 76 of
the Code du Commerce. According to A. Waldmann, to admit a security to the official list
or not is the prerogative of the agent de change as an individual. It is mistankenly, that the
stock exchange committees of Lyon and Paris had taken over in their internal rules the right
to allow or not the trading of a given security. A. Waldmann repeatedly acts to impose his
24CAC Lyon, minutes, general assembly, 21/12/1910.
25CAC Lyon, minutes, committee meeting, 08/11/1897.
26In 1881, Emile Waldmann sells his office to his eldest son, Maurice. Emile’s son cannot resist the crash
of 1882 and has to sell it back to his father.
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views to the Lyon Stock Exchange committee. He thus sends a letter, dated May 31, 1897 to
protest against the cancellation of a price he has written on the official list27. After addressing
several refusals to A. Waldmann and facing his insistence, the head of the Lyon Exchange
submits the issue to his Parisian fellow28. The Paris committee remains firm and ask for the
enforcement of the exchanges’ internal rules. A major event occurs in 1899: Abel Waldmann is
elected at the stock exchange committee29. With this election, the Lyon stockbrokers provide
support to Abel’s thoughts and more importantly give him the possibility to implement this
new listing policy. Thus, after 1899, the stock exchange committee facilitates the admission
process to the official list, notably as far as small and local securities are concerned through
the development of the second part of the list. The agents de change can list any security, as
long as the company that had issues it is regularly constituted.
The agents de change then mutate into real “business touts”: they have the possibility of
finding securities to be admitted in the second part of the official list. Alfred Bonzon will be
one of the most talented in this practice. He is, indeed, at the origin of a successful yearbook
whose geographic scale far exceeds the securities officially listed. On the occasion of the pre-
sentation of his successor, the head of the stock exchange declares that A. Bonzon “by his
constant initiative, our market has welcomed a lot of new securities that, without him, would
not have been known in our financial place”30. Thus, the Lyon market truly becomes a na-
tional market for local securities. The change in the editorial content of the Bourse Lyonnaise,
the only financial newspaper of Lyon, in the mid-1890s shows the inclination towards the local
securities taken by the Lyon Stock Exchange (Bourse Lyonnaise (La) 1879–1907). While the
first issues of this weekly address major economic and financial issues, the newspaper focuses
more and more local securities, notably by devoting long articles to introduce them. From
1898, we can consider that the information distilled in this newspaper mostly covers the Lyon
region.
We try in the next paragraphs to evaluate the role played by local securities in the Lyon
Stock Exchange. We collected all admissions to the Lyon Stock Exchange between 1898 and
1909 from the inquiry by a parliamentary commission led by Jean Jaure`s31. It contains both
introductions and capital increases, but excludes securities already admitted to the Paris of-
ficial list. The final statement contains the name of the securities, the nature of the securities
(stock or bond), the year of admission to listing, the nominal amount of a security, and aver-
27CAC Lyon, minutes, committee meeting, 05/06/1897.
28CAC Lyon, minutes, committee meeting, 12/05/1898.
29CAC Lyon, minutes, committee meeting, 29/12/1899.
30CAC Lyon, minutes, general assembly, 24/03/1902.
31Henri Rochette is at the center of a major financial scandal. He is the founder of Credit Minier, a bank
which handled issues for around 120 millions of francs. Yet almost all of its balance sheets were falsified and
Rochette began a Ponzi scheme: fabulous dividends were paid only thanks to money raised in new issues.
Suspicions raised about participation of some politicians in Rochette’s frauds. That’s why a parliamentary
committee of 33 members is formed on July 11, 1910, in order to investigate“the circumstances which prepared,
preceded, accompanied or followed the arrest of financial Rochette”. See Jeanneney (1981).
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age prices for the period 1898-1909 (one price per year) (Ducros 2011).
We define the securities found in the statement of the Jaure`s commission as “local”. In
other words, these are securities admitted to a regional exchange and are not firstly listed on
the Paris official market. They are most often “small” securities in the sense that the capital
of companies that issue them are not very high.
The results displayed by figures 7 and 8 confirm that Lyon is, according to these measures,
the biggest regional exchange in France. Over the period 1898-1909, 684 securities were ad-
mitted to the Lyon official list, which is nearly 60% of all admissions to provincial exchanges.
Lyon dominance in this area becomes overwhelming after 1900. In terms of the nominal
amount of admissions, Lyon hegemony is less pronounced (figure 8), although figure 9 shows
that Lyon is often, in terms of number of admissions, as important as all the other regional
exchanges together. The peak in terms in admissions in 1901 is related to the formalization
of the Coulisse.
In a second step, we seek to evaluate the securities of the Lyon region among all local
securities admitted to the Lyon Stock Exchange during the period 1898-1914. As such, the
statement of the Jaure`s commission does not provide any clue about the business location.
We find this information in yearbooks devoted to the Lyon Stock Exchange32.
We have to deal with one issue before looking at the empirical evidence: how should we
define a regional security among all the local ones? In yearbooks devoted to the Lyon Stock
Exchange, three kinds of information could help us to characterize which securities were re-
gional and which were not. First, it is possible to collect the location of the notary that
certifies the regular establishment of the company. However, this information is most often
time-invariant and can therefore be largely outdated when the securities are admitted to the
list. In addition, the location of firms can be inferred from the description of the purpose
of the corporation. Nevertheless, in many cases it is not possible to derive an operational
place for each company. We chose to consider a security as “regional” if the headquarters of
the company that issued is, according to the yearbooks, in the nowadays Rhoˆne-Alpes region
where innovative industries are located, such as the movies and car industries in the Rhoˆne
department, the hydroelectric industries in the Grenoble area, as well as old but still active
securities as the mines in the Loire department. We are aware that the method is imperfect33,
but it is easily implementable.
It is then possible to assess the role played by regional securities in the admissions of local
securities. The results are shown in figure 10. On average, two thirds of the securities admit-
32For the period we are interested in, two yearbooks dedicated to the Lyon Stock Exchange were published:
the first by Alfred Bonzon, an agent de change, the Manuel des socie´te´s par actions de la re´gion lyonnaise
(Bonzon five editions between 1893 and 1901), and the second, edited by the Compagnie des Agents de Change
de Lyon, Annales des socie´te´s par actions de la re´gion lyonnaise (Compagnie des Agents de Change de Lyon
five editions between 1903 and 1914).
33For instance, the Cre´dit Lyonnais has its headquarters in Lyon, but “the company is run from Paris”
(Bouvier 1960, p. 108).
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ted to Lyon Stock Exchange are from the Rhoˆne-Alpes region. One third of the admissions
are thus are related to local (but not regional) securities. To the extent that the Lyon Stock
Exchange admits a significant share of local securities to its list, it can be considered to some
extent as a national market for local securities.
At the same time, the operators of the official stock exchange of Lyon continue to maintain
an unofficial market where they trade more speculative French and foreign securities as mines.
This unofficial segment is the most dynamic source of forward business, while the forward
volumes on officially listed securities are decreasing. Despite the desire to maintain market
flexibility, the Lyon Stock Exchange is obliged by regulators to increase regulation of the
unofficial market. If market access was free until 1897, from 1898 it is limited to one clerk per
broker. At the same time, the Exchange sets up regulations to prevent price manipulation to
be published on a specific list: the prices of this list are published under the responsibility of
the trading clerks. The Ministry of Finance also requires a stronger regulation of the mining
market in 1905, which led the Exchange to create a “Small parquet” where clerks can trade
these securities.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we look back at the XIX century France to shed light on effects of competi-
tion in the stock exchange industry. During the XIX century the Paris financial centre plays
a central role in the French financial markets. Nevertheless, six organized regional exchanges
do exist along all the second half of the century. By studying the interactions between Paris
and Lyon, we find that, after the 1881-1882 boom and burst, the Lyon Stock Exchange has
to struggle for surviving facing fierce competition from the Paris Bourse and main national
banks particularly after the 1898 reorganisation of the Paris financial centre. On the contrary,
the strong activity of Coulisse before the 1895 gold mines crash had a positive effect on the
Lyon one. After the 1898 reorganisation, the Lyon Stock Exchange survived thanks to a
new listing policy favourable to SMEs and the development of second-tier market for both
these unofficially traded SMEs and unlisted risky (mainly foreign) stocks. On the other side,
the progressive homogenisation of the official market imposed by regulators to enhance their
control over the French securities market acted as force driving trading to Paris: only the
facilities the Lyon Exchange gave to the main banks of the financial centre maintained some
activity.
The analysis of this natural experiment shows that without a pronounced heterogeneity
stock trading consolidate because of externalities. Nevertheless, the central exchange does
not get all the market because stock exchange members’ rent-maximization behaviour cre-
ates capacity constraints. These capacity constraints create scope for peripheral exchanges if
the peripheral exchanges find niche away from the central exchange’s interests. Within this
framework, (small) size and (distant) localization of the issuers from the centre can create
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barriers to information flows that lock up the niche. On the other side, heterogeneity be-
tween market microstructure can explain the co-existence of competing exchanges. Within
this context, the effect of the main exchanges’ activity over the peripheral ones is ambiguous:
peripheral exchanges can profit from the activity of the one and lose from the activity of the
other, according to the relative competitive hedges.
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Note: The median seat price is computed using both sales and estimates by the stock exchange
committee (for instance, in the case where a broker has to renew his partnership agreement).
No price is available for 1870 and 1873.
Source: CAC Lyon, minutes, committee meeting.
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Sources: Authors’ computations from data disclosed in annual reports (Lyon: CAC Lyon,
minutes, general assembly) and from data kindly provided by Patrick Verley (Paris).
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Paris (commissions) Lyon (commissions) Paris (FTT) Lyon (FTT)
Note: Paris is the official market only. “com” stands for “commissions” and “FTT” refers to
“financial transaction tax”. For the history of this financial transaction tax, see Hautcoeur
et al. (2010).
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Paris_Parquet Lyon Other regional exchanges Paris_Coulisse
Note: “Other regional exchanges” refers the tax paid by Bordeaux, Lille, Marseille, Nantes
and Toulouse.






























































































































































































































Lyon Bordeaux Marseille Toulouse Lille Nantes
Note: Count only. Securities already listed to the Paris official market are not taken into
account there.
Source: Ministry of Finance archives, Fonds Tre´sor, Releve´ des valeurs admises aux Bourses
de province.
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Lyon Bordeaux Marseille Toulouse Lille
Note: We build this figure by adding for each year all the nominal values of securities admitted
to a regional exchange. Securities already listed to the Paris official market are not taken into
account there. Securities without any nominal value such as the parts de fondateur are
excluded. Data for the Nantes Stock Exchange are missing: the committee did not report the
nominal value of the admissions.
Source: Ministry of Finance archives, Fonds Tre´sor, Releve´ des valeurs admises aux Bourses
de province.
38





















Note: Admissions expressed in nominal values. Securities already listed to the Paris official
market are not taken into account there.
Source: Ministry of Finance archives, Fonds Tre´sor, Releve´ des valeurs admises aux Bourses
de province.
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1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909
Nominal value Number of admission
Note: A security is said to be “regional” if the headquarters of the company (or the town or
the department) that issued it is in the nowadays Rhoˆne–Alpes region.
Source: Ministry of Finance archives, Fonds Tre´sor, Releve´ des valeurs admises aux Bourses
de province ; Bonzon (five editions between 1893 and 1901) et Compagnie des Agents de
Change de Lyon (five editions between 1903 and 1914) .
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